The Honourable Mrs Justice Lieven
Child aged 15 - born inter alia with a serious and worsening heart condition - M & F opposed treatment, hence NHS applied for judicial Intervention - inherent jurisdiction.
As indicated in many previous articles, any précis of a case can only act as a reminder that there was a recent case on a particular topic and all law cited by the judge cannot be reproduced, but I try to referred to for guidance.
In this case Bristol NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) applied for an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the court allowing the child (MD), aged 15 years, to receive medical treatment.
The Trust and the Guardian supported the treatment, the Local Authority did not take a position and the (separated) M and F opposed treatment.
MD was born with William's Syndrome, causing inter alia a heart abnormalities, and had been under the care of the cardiology team at Bristol since infancy; and had received early treatment. MD developed supravalvular aortic stenosis (narrowing of aortic valve) (SVAS) in 2020, initially stable but progressively worsened since 2025.
The evidence was that if the obstruction is not treated, it will become more severe leading to either:
(i) sudden cardiac death; or
(ii) gradual intractable heart failure leading to death.
The court had reports from 5 consultants and heard evidence from four of them. All supported the proposed treatment.
The judge recited annual worsening ecg results from 2021 to 2026, and other medical information.
There was no challenge to the fact that open-heart surgery was the only means by which to correct SVAS. There is no minimally invasive stent or "stenosis busting drug" alternative, for example.
The medical evidence was that long-term survival prospects following surgical repair of SVAS appear to be good.
The two stage treatment plan (both under general anaesthetic) was firstly for dental work to minimise bacteraemia to limit or remove risk of endocarditis, a potentially fatal condition, whilst at the same time investigate any coronary abnormalities by angiogram, followed, after recovery by open heart surgery.
One part of the Mother's concern and opposition to the surgery was around what support she and MD will be given after the surgery, and in particular once MD is discharged home.
During the course of proceedings the LA improved their position and committed to an extensive care plan such that the Guardian was content with the final care plan.
The judge started her expression of the law by citing Williams J in University of Leicester Hospitals' NHS Trust v NK [2026] EWHC 1031, who said the key principles are:
a. The court must decide what is in the child's best interests
b. The court must consider those best interests, now, throughout the child’s
minority and through adulthood, without giving excessive weight to short term considerations
c. The court must consider the child's Article 2, 3 and 8 rights
d. Best interest involves a holistic consideration of all factors that go into the child's life
e. The parents' wishes are important but not determinative
The judge then quoted Baroness Hale in Aintree University Hospital NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, at paras [22] & esp [39]:
‘decision-makers must look at (the child's) welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude towards the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or are interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.’
The judge also quoted from An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam) and Re RS (Best Interests: Surgery and Intensive Care) [2025] EWCOP 38 (T3).
The judge carefully examined the process of the medical treatment needed, the effect on the child and concluded it was clearly in child’s interests.
She further added:
It is highly probable that without the operation MD's life expectancy will be materially reduced.
There is also the benefit of an expected improved quality of life
On the evidence at the present time those risks, both of the anaesthetic and the surgery itself, appear to be within acceptable margins.
In dealing with the two stages of surgery required however, the judge felt it appropriate to return to court after stage one, for further information and so that if any party had further submissions the court would hear them.
Authors thoughts: It may be natural for parents to be afraid of consenting to cardiac surgery, for there are risks to all surgery; if consent was given and something went wrong, it is easy to see how a parent would never forgive themselves. I can understand that position.
[1] echocardiogram and electrocardiogram
[2] Also cited in Re A (A Child) 2016 EWCA 759























