To anybody who has painstakingly considered their professional obligations when deciding whether to act for a particular party (or indeed for two or more parties jointly), it can be frustrating when somebody else, whether a legal professional or litigant in person, thinks they know better and assert that your considered choice creates a conflict of interest. For my own part, on the extremely few occasions this has happened, the arguments raised against the choice I had made were unsound and it was a cringey experience to listen to them being advanced. But the temptation to adopt the ad hominem approach of playing the opponent rather than the ball is as old as the hills. And many legal professionals, including myself, have also been faced with clients who, based on their own legal research, are entirely convinced that their opponent’s representation is conflicted out. That is when they are most in need of sound advice.
The recent judgment in A and C (Solicitors: Conflict of Interest, Re [2026] EWHC 2842 (Fam) provides a salutary warning to those blithely seeking to raise such arguments without good quality advice. In a case proceeding under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (‘TOLATA’), an unrepresented Defendant sought to argue that the Claimant’s solicitors’ firm should be restrained from acting for Claimant because an individual solicitor (‘B’) had joined that firm from another firm that had acted for the Defendant in the same case in the past. The Defendant relied on paragraph 6.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct which provides:
"You do not act for a client in a matter where that client has an interest adverse to the interest of another current or former client of you or your business or employer, for whom you or your business or employer holds confidential information which is material to that matter, unless:
(1) effective measures have been taken which result in there being no real risk of disclosure of the confidential information; or
(2) the current or former client whose information you or your business or employer holds has given informed consent, given or evidenced in writing, to you acting, including to any measures to protect their information".
The Defendant also relied on the widely known case of Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) 2 AC 222; [1998] UKHL 52 to advance that “the knowledge of a solicitor is instantly imputed to their entire firm” and that “retroactive” information barriers (i.e. B not being involved in the case at his new firm) cannot “cure” the asserted breach of rule 6.5 of the SRA Code.
In dismissing the Defendant’s application to restrain the Claimant’s firm from acting, Miss Nageena Khalique KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge rejected that the authorities established any such proposition and, quoting Lord Millett at paragraph 50 of her judgment set out the correct understanding which is, that “where a former client establishes that confidential information has been imparted and the firm proposes to act against a former client in a matter to which the information is or may be relevant, the burden shifts to the firm to satisfy that there is no real risk of disclosure.”
The Judge also relied on the longstanding authority of Rakusen v Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch. 831 for dual propositions that were effectively fatal to the Defendant’s case: (i) that there is no absolute rule of law in England that a solicitor may not act in litigation against a former client; and (ii) that the solicitor may be restrained from acting if such a restriction is necessary to avoid a significant risk of the disclosure or misuse of confidential information belonging to the former client”.
The Judge also referred to the well-known Court of Appeal case of Koch Shipping Inc v Richard Butler (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1280 and helpfully, at paragraph 58 of the judgment, the analysis of the applicable principles by Williams J in ZS v FS (Application to Prevent Solicitor Acting) [2017] EWHC 2660 (Fam). In line with earlier authorities, both Koch and ZS v FS emphasise that perception of potential conflict is important, but also that there has to be a real risk of the disclosure of confidential information before the court would intervene to restrain a solicitor from acting. In sub-paragraph (d) of the paragraph 58 summary from ZS v FS it was emphasised that the onus is on the legal professional to consider whether they can act in the first instance.
Having heard B’s oral evidence, the Judge found him to be an impressive witness and made findings, among others, that: B had no recollection of the Defendant or his case; B was locked out of his old firm’s case files; B holds no confidential information of the Defendant’s’; B works in a different office and within a different team than the Claimant’s team and has no communication with that team. It is therefore wholly unsurprising that the Judge found there was no risk of the disclosure of confidential information.
This case will doubtless have been frustrating for the Claimant’s team, not only because of the significant disruption to individuals such as B, but also disruption to the smooth and efficient running of the long running litigation. The published judgment does not make any reference to costs, but clearly the general rule on costs under CPR 44.2 applies in TOLATA proceedings, which are often ruinously and disproportionately expensive in any event, and the application will have increased costs substantially.
The important points for legal professionals, in particular, to remember are that each case turns on its own facts, the mere fact of having acted previously for an opposing party without a real risk of disclosure of relevant confidential information is not enough to restrain a solicitor from acting, and that a great deal of thought should precede taking any potential conflict of interest point. The stakes can be high both financially for the client and reputationally for a professional advancing such arguments. Both firms and individuals such as barristers rightly put a great deal of thought into compliance with their professional obligations, and simply assuming they have not done so is foolhardy.























