Sometimes you get a judgement that is well worded and hard to précis in under 1000 words, and I found that to be the case here. Consequently, if ‘something is lost in the translation’ forgive me for that, or not, as you will!
This was an application by a sole adopter (H’s uncle) to adopt H under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 51; the requirements in s 49 as to domicile/habitual residence being met.
H’s parents had a history of drug abuse and DA, but F rehabilitated in 2014 and has been clean since.
Child H, born in 2008, was known to the local authority before birth and she remained in her parents' care until December 2010 when she was removed under police protection, and placed with her maternal uncle (current applicant) and her grandmother.
In 2014 the applicant (H’s uncle), together with his mother Mrs J, applied for a special guardianship order, and this order was made in November 2014 when H was six years old. The parents opposed the application. At that time M was still using drugs and F was undergoing treatment.
M’s contact ceased in 2014 and F’s in 2016.
In July 2019 H's uncle and grandmother both applied to adopt her. But they were not a couple, and grandmother aborted the application in 2020 after annexe A report did not support it.
In June 2025, the present application was issued by the applicant uncle. Child H was joined as a party and an Annexe A report directed, H’s parents was represented, the applicant and applicants mother were not.
In July 2025, a one-off contact took place between H and each parent.
Back to law - under s 47(9), provided that the application is issued before a child reaches 18, the court may make an order thereafter, provided the young person has not reached the age of 19.
Under s 47, the consent of all of those with parental responsibility is required unless dispensed with by the court. The court may dispense with consent under s 52(1) if the welfare of the child requires it.
The child's welfare throughout her life is the court's paramount consideration. The court will consider the factors in the welfare checklist in ACA 2002, s 1(4) but the judge commented, because H is now an adult some of those factors were less relevant than others.
The judge emphasised adoption is a profound and transformative order with lifelong consequences saying the court must accordingly be satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate: see Re B [2013] UKSC 33.
This required a balancing exercise in which the advantages and disadvantages of the realistic options are weighed side by side: Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.
Further, the judge recited paras 46, 47, 62 & 66 of what McFarlane LJ said in Re P (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1174. These paragraphs are not repeated verbatim here but inter alia, bullet pointed:
- It is necessary to evaluate the proportionality of the intervention in family life that is being proposed.
- ‘Nothing else will do’ was referred to.
- The difference between family members and strangers adopting a child was different.
- There is a qualitative difference between these two options in terms of the degree to which the outcome will interfere with the ECHR, Art 8 rights to family life of the child and a child’s parents.
- And what is being lost by the making of an adoption order?
The judge then reviewed the witnesses and the written and oral evidence and (again bullet pointed) continued:
- I remind myself that my paramount consideration is H's welfare throughout her life.
- Whether or not an adoption order is made, there will be no effect on H's day to day life.
- Adoption will change H's paternity and leave her with no legal mother; the person who is now her mother will become her aunt.
- She will be legally cut off from her paternal family.
- I consider her wishes and feelings, and closely linked, the main welfare factor in this case is her psychological and emotional wellbeing, both now and in the longer term.
- H's experiences have left her with a profound craving for a legal endorsement of her lived reality.
- The long-term consequences, in terms of her psychological wellbeing, are difficult to predict and she may come to regret either outcome.
- I see this case as finely balanced. I have, however, concluded that H's welfare requires that an adoption order is made.
- There is a need for an adoption order now that was not present when the court considered H's living arrangements in 2014 and 2020.
- I make that order, dispensing with the birth parents' consent on the grounds that H's welfare requires me to do so. H's day to day life will not change as a result of this decision.
Well, I hope I’ve picked the bones out of this case, and it is informative; what struck me was an unusual situation of someone of H’s age wanting to be adopted, but it is a case where the judge carefully weighed up all the factors, and made a decision in H’s interests, both physical and psychological.
